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ABSTRACT 
Smart contracts allow for automated compliance with contractual rules. They derive their 
“smartness” from an execution software that catches the most typical defaults and responds 
by mechanically triggering a compensation payment or another prearranged consequence. 
Through this self-enforcement mode, smart contracts are able to save time and effort that 
is associated with more customary rights enforcement mechanisms. Now, whereas compli-
ance with in-house rules or corporate governance standards is common today, compliance 
with contract law only occurs on a voluntary basis. This might, however, change if businesses 
should be obliged to automatically meet customer claims through smart contracts. On the 
basis of a sample case, this article examines the pros and cons of smart consumer contracts 
and carves out the most suitable applications of smart contracts as a means to ensure private 
law compliance.
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I. BACKGROUND: TRADITIONALLY LIMITED COMPLIANCE WITH PRIVATE 
LAWS 
 
Compliance typically refers to the duty of companies to act in accordance with public law. 
Failure to comply is sanctioned by a civil penalty or by means of criminal law. During the 
last several decades, the importance and influence of compliance departments has signifi-
cantly grown. At the same time, whether or not businesses choose to comply with the 
growing body of private law is still regarded a strategic decision rather than a straightfor-
ward legal duty. Private law is designed to be available as a state-provided system of rules 
for cases where conflicts of private interests cannot be otherwise resolved. Traditionally, 
however, the enforcement of private claims is relegated to the resolve of the very persons 
involved. In principle, the state does not care whether market participants eventually avail 
themselves of their rights. If they back off from making a claim, their opponent goes free, 
and the state is fine with that. 
 
This regulatory approach gives remarkable leeway to the strategic decisions of repeat play-
ers.1 They might voluntarily meet private law obligations as an aspect of a service strategy, 
but they can just as easily wait out any customer requests and count on a common aver-
sion to bring legal action. In spite of these options, there is a strong incentive to choose 
the latter alternative. As market dynamics focus more on low prices rather than customer 
service, it becomes more difficult to stand one’s ground in the market without cutting 
back on private law compliance.2 This calculus notably applies in the field of consumer 
law, because the vast majority of consumers are extremely risk-averse and have little 
knowledge of their rights and no experience in enforcing them. Hence, there is a consid-
erable threshold for consumers to take legal action.3 Sure enough, most consumer rights 
are mandatory and, thus, cannot be contractually waived. However, the mandatory na-
ture of consumer rights makes little difference in this decision paradigm, as mandatory 
rights are just as likely to remain unclaimed. 
 
If claimants shy away from enforcing their rights, other market participants will some-
times step in and take on the job. The law of unfair commercial practices allows businesses 
to sue their rivals for injunction in cases of grossly unfair market behavior. However, com-
petition rules are usually limited to correct the way customers are approached, whereas 			
1  A profound analysis of the advantages of repeat players compared to one-shotters is provided by Marc Ga-
lanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. SOC. REV. 95, 
97-114 (1974). 
2  The economic concept for this kind of market dynamic is the famous market for lemons as described in George 
A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. 
ECON. 488 (1970). 
3  See, e.g., Franziska Weber & Michael Fauré, The Interplay Between Public and Private Enforcement in Euro-
pean Private Law: Law and Economics Perspective, EUROP. REV. PRIV. L 525, 533 (2015). 	
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competitors can typically neither request proper contract performance nor demand com-
pliance with other contractual rights of their customers.4 In some jurisdictions, consumer 
organizations and trade commissions dispose over special procedural rights to bundle cus-
tomer claims and enforce them collectively.5 However, these mechanisms are actually em-
ployed in only a small fraction of possible cases, which makes them hardly more effective 
than the existing alternatives, namely easy-to-use court or conciliation procedures.6 Thus, 
compliance with private law and with consumer rights in particular remains unalluring 
for most market participants. From a traditional viewpoint, this is an almost natural con-
sequence of private law being private law. However, the more companies ignore claims 
out of sheer calculus, the more pressing becomes the question how private law can be 
rendered more meaningful for legal practice. 
II. SMART CONTRACTS AS A COMPLIANCE INSTRUMENT 
 
Only recently, a potential solution for this problem has presented itself, the development 
of smart contracts. Smart contracts attempt to facilitate rights enforcement by automating 
contract execution, as well as the handling of typical impairments of performance. For 
this purpose, contracts are translated into computer code and digitally connected to some 
assets of the parties. Hence, the “contract machine” automatically detects changing cir-
cumstances or events of default and takes the predetermined action.7 Of course, this con-
cept requires contract lawyers to design a contract that anticipates as many problematic 
situations as possible. Moreover, programmers are demanded to link detection mecha-
nisms (the so-called oracles) to the appropriate legal consequence without creating fric-
tions with the word and spirit of the contract. 
 
With the growing extent of data tracks, the scope of application for smart contracts is 
rapidly expanding. For example, a car sharing contract could be made smart by charging 
the renter a contractual penalty for speeding, or by automatically locking the car if she 			
4  In Europe, the law of unfair competition is governed by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
2005/29/EC; see Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising, in Un-
derstanding Consumer Law 61-117 (Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Norbert Reich & Peter Rott eds., 2009). 
5  A good overview on the legal situation in Europe is provided by the contributions to WILLEM VAN BOOM 
& MARCO LOOS, COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW: SECURING COMPLI-
ANCE IN EUROPE THROUGH PRIVATE GROUP ACTION AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY INTER-
VENTION (2007). 
6  The European Union has issued a small claims procedure through its Regulation (EC) No 861/2007, recently 
amended by Regulation (EU) 2015/2421. With its Directive 2013/11/EU on consumer dispute resolution, the 
EU switched to an out-of-court approach, obliging its Member States to provide access to free-of-cost concili-
ation for consumer disputes; critical assessment by Horst Eidenmüller and Martin Engel, Against False Settle-
ment: Designing Efficient Consumer Rights Enforcement Systems in Europe, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 
261-297 (2014). 
7  See, e.g., Alexander Savelyev, Contract law 2.0: „Smart“ contracts as the beginning of the end of classic contract 
law, 20 INF. & COMM. TECHNOL. L. 116, 120-121 (2017); Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart 
Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 306, 309 (2017); Mark Giancaspro, Is a „smart contract“ really a smart 
idea? Insights from a legal perspective, 33 COMP. L. & SEC. REV. 825, 826 (2017); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas 
Cornell, Contracts ex machina, 67 DUKE L. REV. 313, 330-352 (2017). 
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illegally drives abroad. Likewise, a mobile phone contract could be complemented by soft-
ware that observes network availability and issues some sort of a lump-sum compensation 
if the network becomes unavailable for more than ten minutes. Another scenario could 
involve a lawyer working on her client’s documents in a cloud who receives remuneration 
only for the time she is actively working in the cloud database. The key advantage of a 
smart contract in these cases is that the parties to a contract are automatically forced to 
comply with their contractual duties. To put it in legal Latin: Pacta non modo sunt 
servanda sed etiam sunt servata. 
 
The sixty-four dollar question, however, is: What incentive is there for any contracting 
party to attach a self-enforcement mechanism to a contract? Here, two cases have to be 
distinguished. On the one hand, where two contractors meet at eye level and could both 
be subject to automatic enforcement, there might be a common interest in contract relia-
bility that leads both parties to agree to a smart contract. On the other hand, where there 
is a considerable power imbalance between both parties, like in consumer contracts, there 
is little reason for the mightier part to agree to a self-enforcing compliance system. This is 
exactly the very reason why many companies hesitate to meet civil claims today. Thus, the 
only way to change their calculus would be a law requiring companies to make use of 
smart contracts when doing business with consumers. This seems to be inconsistent with 
the nature of private law, to wit, a law that is not enforced by the state. However, at least 
in Germany, the government currently considers to do just that: encourage or even com-
pel companies to use smart contracts in an effort to make the enforcement of consumer 
rights more effective.8 
III. SAMPLE CASE: A SMART RAILWAY TRANSPORT CONTRACT 
 
How could such a private law compliance mechanism be applied in practice? The parlia-
mentary group of one of the political parties that formed the current German government 
offers two concrete examples. In their view, smart contracts could be used to facilitate 
compensation claims for flight or railway transport contracts.9 
 
Thus, imagine a train carrying 100 passengers from Munich to Berlin for 100 € per ticket, 
the regular travel time being 4 hours. If this train is one hour late, Art. 17(1) (a) of the 
European Regulation No 1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations grants pas-
sengers a refund of 25% of the ticket price. If usually 10% of all trains are delayed for one 
hour or more10 and 10% of all passengers take the trouble to claim their refund, the railway 
operator will set aside 0.25% of his turnover for satisfying these claims. Now, as soon as 			
8  For further details see Martin Fries, Smart consumer contracts: The end of civil procedure?, Oxford Business 
Law Blog (Mar. 29, 2018, 11:18 AM), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/03/smart-con-
sumer-contracts-end-civil-procedure. 
9  See the explanation at (Mar. 05, 2018, 09:40 AM), https://www.spdfraktion.de/themen/verbraucherinnen-
verbraucher. 
10  Delays of two hours or more result in a refund of 50% of the ticket price. To simplify matters, this is not taken 
into calculation here. 
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the respective transport contract is connected to smart enforcement software, the enforce-
ment ratio will bounce up to almost 100%. This will make the railway operator increase 
the provisions from 0.25% to 2.5% of the ticket price, leading ceteris paribus to a general 
price increase of roughly 2%. 
 
A rise in prices in this range will be perceptible and decision-relevant only for few custom-
ers. As a matter of fact, this finding considerably changes as soon as the compensation 
amount increases or is also triggered by minor delays. If, for example, the railway operator 
had to pay every passenger 50 cents for every minute of delay, the loss of revenue would 
considerably increase, and the consequential price increase would be quite perceivable. If 
the average long-distance train is 10 minutes late and the train operator is required to re-
fund 5 €, on average, to every customer, ticket prices would go up respectively. Given this 
scenario, one might wonder about the advantages of such a system over a world without 
any delay compensations. Is granting a refund to a customer that she ends up paying for 
through increased ticket prices a better world. 
IV. A CONTRIBUTION TO MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
The main reason for an appropriate compensation of damages in general and transporta-
tion delays in particular is fair competition.11 In a price-oriented market economy, market 
participants expect the cost of a product or service to reflect a good or service that is free 
of impairments. If customers pay the full price, but receive only faulty contract perfor-
mance without a compensation, their product choice and, thus, the functioning of the 
market will be flawed. Companies will anticipate this mechanism and often interpret it as 
a complimentary ticket to defer necessary investments in the quality and reliability of 
products and services. 
 
Of course, those misguided incentives for businesses will sometimes be alleviated by dis-
appointed customers sharing their experience with others and thereby lowering the mar-
ket expectation of product quality. For example, a frequent rail traveler will soon get a feel 
for the delay she can expect when traveling by train and, if need be, switch to other means 
of transportation like planes, buses, or rental cars. However, this mechanism only works 
in markets where there is considerable competition and with either frequent deal iteration 
or reliable information exchange between customers, e.g., within the framework of a qual-
ity rating system provided by a trading platform. In a market without these features, dam-
age compensation makes an important contribution to properly functioning competition 
and, thus, market efficiency. This expectation, however, is based on several requirements 
that a compensation scheme has to meet in order to actually make the market better off. 
			
11  This is, of course, a very condensed statement that is not meant to slur the extensive literature on the purposes 
of compensatory damages; see, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damages Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. 
ECON. 466-490 (1980); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 128-140 (9. ed. 2014) 
with further references. 
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V. PRECONDITIONS TO AN EFFECTIVE SMART COMPENSATION SCHEME 
 
The best enforcement mechanism cannot achieve a better result than the one determined 
in the underlying substantive law. The special challenge for smart enforcement mecha-
nisms is their need for simple laws whose legal elements can be easily assessed. Lump-sum 
compensation laws, like the airline passenger rights laid down in Art. 7 of the European 
Regulation No 261/2004, are a good example for fairly automatable rules. At the same 
time, such a simplifying regulatory technique comes at the expense of the merits of every 
particular case where the appropriate compensation might not only vary, but also be dif-
ficult to quantify. 
 
Another aspect to bear in mind is the coding design of the compliance software that is 
used to cure typical events of default by issuing a money transfer, locking or unlocking 
the object of agreement, or the like. The software needs to match the underlying contract 
as far as possible, because if there is any doubt about the default, the contract itself has the 
final say.12 However, experience tells us that algorithms always come along with program-
ming errors, be it because of inadvertence or by intention of one party without genuine 
willingness to comply. This calls for an algorithm check by some neutral agency as long as 
the enforcement mechanism is not set up on neutral ground like on a blockchain. In the 
case of passenger rights, this algorithm check could be performed by a government agency 
like the British Office of Rail and Road, the French Autorité de Régulation des Activités 
Ferroviaires, or the German Bundesnetzagentur. 
 
Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that a smart compensation scheme can lead to a 
distortion of competition if some competitors are obliged and others are not. Thus, if a 
government decides to impose civil law compliance duties only on certain companies 
while leaving others unregulated, this decision should be based on well-founded criteria. 
Such criteria could be a factual opacity of product quality, or a monopolistic situation 
that makes a business insensitive towards customer feedback. Both criteria might indeed 
most likely be met in the field of passenger transportation as there is low competition on 
many national and international routes, and even experienced customers can only rarely 
assess the probability of an on-time arrival. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
Smart contracts combine legal obligations with a compliance mechanism. A conventional 
contract is enhanced with software that automatically issues legal consequences once a 
pre-specified trigger event is detected. Quite recently, discussions have been initiated 
about using smart contracts as a means to achieve compliance with private consumer law. 
It is debatable whether a public law obligation that forces companies to add an automated 
enforcement component to their consumer contracts goes well with the traditional con-
cept of private rights being dependent on the proactive behavior of the claimant. Anyway, 			
12  Martin Fries, Smart Contracts: Brauchen schlaue Verträge noch Anwälte?, ANWBL 86, 87 (2018). 
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if the use of smart contracts shall be imposed on businesses, the analysis has shown that 
this approach will be most useful in monopolistic industries where the market does not 
provide other effective mechanisms to ensure the quality of a product or service. 
